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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.'
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
2
SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT. s
AGENT.
An insurance agent to receive and transmit applications is an agent to
receive and transmit notice, which building, where there are two, was
intended: Lycoming Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sailer, 67 Penna.
Payment of the debts of a principal by the agent are presumed to be
from the principal's money: Woods v. Gummert, 67 Penna.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY.
Where, on the trial of an action for assault and battery, the jury,
upon the whole charge of the judge, were left to consider a charge of
false swearing, made by the defendant against the plaintiff, at the time
of the assault, one of the circumstances to enhance the damages; it was
held, that this was erroneous, and for such error a new trial was.granted:
Pulver v. H arris, 61 Barb.
ASSUMPSIT.
Contract-Compensation for Labor.-Where one goes to work for
another under an agreement to be compensated in -a particular way, he
is entitled to compensation in money upon the refusal of the other to
compensate him as was agreed upon: Stone v.. Stone, 43 Vt.
The plaintiff and defendant entered into a parol agreement, by which
the plaintiff was to go to work for the defendant on his farm and help
him pay off some encumbrances thereon, and the defendant was to deed
the plaintiff one-half the farm, no definite time for making the deed
being agreed upon. The plaintiff worked from May 1st to November
under the agreement, the defendant neglecting upon repeated demands
to make the deed, and in November the plaintiff left upon giving notice
that he should leave unless the defendant gave him the deed, which he
still neglected to do. Reld, that the plaintiff could recover in assum sit
for his labor: .7d.
ATTACHMENT.
In an action brought by the receivers of an insurance company upon
premium notps, it is no defence that before the commencement of the
action, but after the company had ceased to have a corporate existence,
the claim in suit had been attached in an action pending in the state of
Massachusetts, where the defendant resided, by a creditor of the insur-
ance company, and that the plaintiffs had made themselves parties to
that suit, which was still pending: Osgood et al.. v. MAfaguire, 61 Barb.
The pendency of an attachment suit in another state is no bar to the
action in New York, although a Judgment there might be: Id.
I From lion. 0. L. Barbour; to appear in vol. 61 of his Reports.
2 From P. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 67 Penna. State Reports.
-3 From W. G. Veazey, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 43 Vt. Reports.
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ATTORNEY.
Lien-Default-Judgment.--Where a default is entered in an action
of covenant and the case continued, and the parties then make a bond
fide settlement of the litigated claim and costs, the plaintiff's attorneys
will not be entitled to have a judgment in favor of the plaintiff against
the defendant for their benefit as counsel. The entry of the default
does not constitute a perfected judgment, and no such lien then existed
in favor of the plaintiff's counsel for fees and expenses as would prevent
the defendant from making a bond fide settlement: Rooper v. Welch,
43 Vt,
AUDITA QUERELA. See Debtor and Creditor.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Irregular Endorsement.-Scott drew a note for his own accommoda-
tion to the order of Slack; to secure its discount at bank, he procured
Kirk's endorsement who placed his name above Slack's. Slack paid
one-half the note; Kirk under threat of suit by the bank paid the
other half. Held, that Kirk could recover from Slack the amount paid
by him: Slack v. Kirk, 67 Penna.
Slack by his endorsement was liable to the bank for the amount of
the note: Id.
As to the bank, Slack could set up neither the Statute of Frauds nor
Kirk's want of liability: id.
Slack could not object to payment to any transferee of the bank or
to any one rightfully paying the bank and entitled to substitution to its
rights : Id.
Kirk as irregular endorser was the only one, who could set up the
Statute of Frauds, and if he, although an irregular endorser, chose to
comply with his parol promise to pay, no one could object: Id.
Kirk had a right to pay if he would, and having paid, to be subro-
gated to the rights of the bank: Id.
There was a moral obligation on Kirk to perform his promise to pay
the bank, and this followed by actual payment constituted his equity
and entitled him to substitution: Id.
On paying the bank, Kirk was entitled to the note and could claim
as holder under Slack's blank endorsement: -d.
AIffdavit of defence.-In a suit on a negotiable note by an endorsee
against the maker, the affidavit of defence was that the note was the
property of the payee, that the endorser's name was used to avoid a
defence of usury against the note, that the note had been "renewed four
times and at each time the payee received usury and the defendant was
entitled to a defence to the extent of the usury. The defendant did
not aver that he expected to be able to prove the defence alleged. .eld,
to be a sufficient affidavit of defence: Evans v. kohe, 67 Penna.
It is not necessary on such positive affidavit that defendant should
aver his ability to prove the defence alleged, especially as the defendant
is a competent witness on the trial: Id.
COMMON CARRIER.
Liability under a Special Contract; Construction and Effect of Agree-
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ment.-The defendant was a common carrier, owning and operating a
railroad extending from Baltimore, Md., to Parkersburgh, W. Va., on
the Ohio river, but not owning any railroad terminating either in the
city of New York or at Maysville, Ky. On the 1st of September
1866, one of the plaintiffs called at the defendant's freight office in
New York, and stated to the freight agent that he was desirous of send-
ing certain merchandise to his firm at Maysville, and inquired at what
rate the defendant would carry the same. The agent mentioned the
rate, and instructed the plaintiff how to mark and where to deliver the
freight. The plaintiff did not accept the proposition at the time or
agree to ship any goods, but directed B. & Co., of whom he had pur-
chased certain goods, to mark the same in the manner specified by the
freight agent, and to send the same to the freight depot he had named.
On the 19th of September B. & Co. delivered such goods at th6 depot,
marked as directed, and addressed to the plaintiffs at Maysville. Held,
1. That the conversation between the plaintiff and the freight agent
did not am6unt to an agreement by the former to ship any goods, and
that the sending of the goods to the place designated, marked as
directed, eighteen days afterwards, could not be said to be an acceptance
by the plaintiff of what was but an offer or proposition on the part of
the defendant. 2. That the contract, whatever it was, was made when
the plaintiffs, on the 19th of September, through B. & Co. shipped the
goods in question and took a receipt therefor. 3. That the contract
between the parties was contained in the receipt then given: Ricketts v.
The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 61 Barb.
And, it being, by the express terms of such receipt, agreed that the
company should alone be held answerable f6r the goods, in whose actual
custody they should be at the happening of loss, Held, that for a loss
occurring after the delivery thereof by the defendant at the end of its
road, at Parkersburgh, to other carriers for transportation by steamboat
from that place to lMlaysville, the defendant was not liable: Id.
CONTRACT. See Deed.
Payment of Mone.-In ordinary cases the payment of money is not
necessary to make a contract complete. 'It is only where the question
is whether a future contract was not in contemplation that it becomes
of significance: Orr's Appeal, 67 Penna.
Fraud-Evidence- endor.-A deed tendered containing an imper-
fect description, but like that in the articles, held to be admissible in an
action of debt to recover the purchase-money: Negley et al. v. Lindsay,
67 Penna.
In an action of debt to recover the purchase-money under an agree-
ment, the defence being fraud in misrepresenting the value of the land,
evidence was inadmissible for the plaintiff that he previously had a
higher offer for the land from responsible persons : Id.
Where a contract is void on the ground of public policy or against a
statute, its confirmation is affected with the original taint: Id.
Where a contract is void on account of fraud practised on the party,
it may be confirmed or ratified without a new contract founded on a new
consideration : Id.
If a contract be merely against conscience, and the party being in-
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formed of all its circumstances and the objections to it, confirms it, he
bars himself from the relief he otherwise might have had : Id.
In an action of debt for the purchase-money of land for which he
bound himself by articles to give "a warranty deed," the plaintiff de-
clared that he had kept and observed the agreement and'had been at
all times ready and willing to do and perform all things required by it;
the plea was, that the plaintiff was not at the date of the agreement
and is not seised of the land. This was a traverse of the plaintiff's per-
formance and readiness to perform, and was notice to the plaintiff to
prove his title: Id.
Under the pleadings the onus was on the plaintiff to prove that he
had a good title before he could recover the purchase-money: Id.
CORPORATION.
FPofeiture for Non- User-Receiver.-An action cannot be maintained
against a corporation by a stockholder to effect a forfeiture of the charter,
for non-user within a year. And in any case, even when the action is
brought by the Attorney-General, a receiver cannot be appointed until
judgment in the action: Gilman v. The Green Point Sugar Company,
61 Barb.
Lease executed by.-A lease, executed by one gas company to another,
of its works and property for five years, with the privilege of renewal
for five years longer, the necessary effect of which is to suspend the
ordinary business of the lessor for more than one year, is invalid, as
against the stockholders not consenting to its execution : Copeland v.
The Citizens' Gas Light Company, 61 Barb.
Action to set aside Lease.-An action to set, aside such lease may be
brought by a stockholder in the lessor's company who has not consented
to or ratified the execution of such lease, in behalf of himself and other
stockholders similarly situated: Id.
In such an action, the court is not bound to adjust the equities between
the lessor and the lessee, where such equities are not embraced in the
pleadings containing the issues tried : Id.
Liability of Corporation and its Agents for Torts.-In an action
brought against a corporation and its managing agents, to recover dam-
ages for an injury to real estate caused by the explosion of a steam-
boiler upon the premises of the corporation, it is, erroneous to charge the
jury that such agents are not liable for any negligence or unskilfulness
on the part of the corporation, or the manuficturers of the boilers:
Losee v. Buchanan, 61 Barb.
Where an injury done by a corporation, is occasioned by the negligence
or unskilfulness of the agent who put the corporation in motion, it is
erroneous to hold that the corporation alone is liable, and not the con-
trolling agent : Id.
It is also erroneous to hold that a corporation may escape liability, if
an injury occurs at the time its sub-agent, whom it employs to conduct
its affairs, happens to be in charge; or, that in such a case, the corpora-
tion, only, is liable: Id.
In an action against a corporation and its managing agents, to recover
damages for an injury to real estate caused by the explosion of a steam-
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boiler, owned by it, it is erroneous to charge that if the engineer who
had charge of the boiler came to the conclifsion that to reduce the pres-
sure from 120 to 110 pounds to the square inch would render the use
of the boiler prudent and safe, and communicated that idea to a director
and managing agent, and the latter believed and acted upon the inform-
ation, then he was not liable : -d.
It is also error to refuse to charge, in such an action, that the defend-
ants cannot excuse or justify themselves, in the use of the boiler in
question, on the ground that the same was purchased of reputable manu-
facturers; where it is proved that the size, form, character, and materials
of the boiler had been directed and ordered by the defendants, and the
boiler was made in conformity with the directions : Id.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Libel.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Executon-Half-Pay of .Army Pfcer.-The half-pay of an officer of
the government is not liable to be taken by his creditors: Elwyn's Ap-
peal, 67 Penna.
The pay having reached the beneficiary (a lunatic) and lost its dis-
tinctive character and being in the hands of his committee, as a distri-
butable fund it is to be governed by the direction of the law: Id.
A surplus of the pay not needed for the lunatic's subsistence may be
applied with the sanction of the court for the payment of his debts : Id.
His pay in the future could not be assigned by him if sane, nor inter-
cepted by creditors : ld.
In the distribution of such fund in the hands of the committee, it is
not liable to the claim of the $300 exemption against creditors: Id.
Audita Querela-Fraududent Judgment-Attaching Creditors- Costs.
-Subsequent attaching creditors cannot maintain audita guerela, using
the name of the judgment-debtor against his consent, to vacate a judg-
ment, execution, and levy in favor of a prior attaching creditor, without
showing a legal right to the property levied upon paramount to the right
of such creditor, and also that in order to avail themselves of that right
it is necessary that the proceedings under which the prior creditor ac-
quired his title be vacated and set aside by audita qaerela. And the
suit failing, the defendant would be entitled to his costs : Essex Mining
Company v. Bullard, 43 Vt.
Showing that the debtor was a non-resident and the prior attaching
creditor obtained judgment without notice, by publication or otherwise,
is not sufficient: Id.
Neither can they maintain their right to prosecute such suit upon the
ground that the equitable owner of a demand has the right, when neces-
sary, to use the name of him who has the legal interest. Nor upon the
ground that they may enter and defend the suit of a prior attaching
creditor. Nor because the judgment sought to be vacated was fraudu-
lent as to creditors; for if fraudulent in that respect it is void as to
them, and they may pursue the property in disregard of the prior attach-
ment and levy, without resorting to audita querela or other proceeding
to vacate the judgment and levy: Id.
The fact of an agreement of the first attaching creditor, before he
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made his attachment, that the attachment on his writ and on those of
the subsequent attaching creditors, should all 'tand on an equal footing,
and the property attached should respond to their several debts pro ratd,
and that upon this understanding he was employed to procure the attach-
ments to be made, and that he has taken the whole property upon his
own debt and refused to dividepro rat, would not entitle the subsequent
attaching creditors to use the name of the judgment-debtor to prosecute
audita querela to vacate the judgment and levy, for the above causes,
viz., defect in service and fraudulent judgment: Id.
There are many errors and mere technical lirregularities in the pro-
ceedings under a prior attachment, which the defendant in such proceed-
ings may waive, or may successfully interpose, at his election, but of
which a subsequent attaching creditor cannot avail himself: Id.
DEED. See Contract.
Alteration in-Plan.-It is incumbent on a grantee to show that an
alteration, beneficial to him, in a deed, was properly made : Robinson et
al. v. Myers, 67 Penna.
If it appear that the alteration is written with the same pen and ink
as the body, the inference would be that it was made before the sealing
and delivery; if otherwise such inference would not arise and other evi-
dence would be required to explain it: Id.
The law does not presume that an interlineation in a deed is a forgery
or made after execution; it is a question of fact for the jury, upon proof
adduced by him who offers the deed : Id.
R. made, laid out, and numbered town lots, and recorded the plot;
amongst others were 269, 270, and 271. By deed referring to the plot,
he conveyed 271 to M., as bounded on the east by an alley, and 269 to
W., as bounded on the west by an alley; no alley appearing on the
plot. On the application of J., who had become the owner of 269 and
271 and representing 270 as an alley, the Quarter Sessions vacated "said
lot 270." Held, that J. was not entitled to 270: Id.
The plot being referred to, was as much a part of the deed as if incor-
porated in them: Id.
]1. and J. fenced 270 and used it as a yard; if it had been an alley,
this was an extinguishment: Id.
If an alley, it was extinguished also by the proceedings in the Quarter
Sessions: Id.
Ancient-Estoppel by a Married Woman.-To authorize the admission
of a deed as ancient, where the only circumstance relied on is possession,
nothing less than proof of possession for thirty years in conformity with
the deed is sufficient to raise the presumption of its authenticity: Walker
et al. v. Walker, 67 Penna.
Where proof of possession cannot be had, the deed may be read, if
its genuipeness be satisfactorily established by other circumstances : Id.
Children agreed without the knowledge of their father to release to
one of them all their right to the father's land at his death, if that one
would maintain the father for life. Such contract was not against public
policy: Id.
Two of the children were married women who did not acknowledge
the deed as such: Held, that it was binding on the others: Id.
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The deed was not a legal conveyance, but the agreement having been
performed by the maintenance of the father; on his death it would be
supported in equity as an estoppel: Id.
ESTOPPEL. See Deed.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Parol Contractfor Sale of Land.-Proof of a parol contract for the
sale of land, delivery of possession pursuant thereto, part payment of the
purchase-money and valuable improvements, are the full measure of what
is required to take a case out of the Statute of Frauds: Milliken v.
Dravo, 67 Penna.
HIGHWAY.
Contributory Negligence.-Where the plaintiff's gig was broken in
passing a depression in the highway, it was held, that he was entitled to
recover for the injury, provided the accident happened through the
insufficiency of the road and without any lack of ordinary care on the
part of the plaintiff in the mode of driving and in discovering any im-
perfection in the gig, although it was unsafe and its defects contributed
to the accident: Fletcher v. Town of Barnet, 43 7t.
Pent Road-urisdiction-Justice of the Peae.-In an action against
an individual for obstructing a public pent road alleged in the declaration
and proved to have been laid through the defendant's land, the title to
land is not so involved as to oust the jurisdiction of a justice to try the
case. The right to recover would not depend on the defendant's owner-
ship of the land: Bell v. Prouty, 43 Vt.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Deed.
Appeal from Order granting Alimony/-Reference as to.-This court,
at general term, can not only entertain an appeal from an order granting
alimony, but may order a reference, to ascertain a suitable amount to be
allowed: Galinger v. Galinger, 61 Barb.
Decree for Arrears.-A decree for divorce should not direct the pay-
ment, by the defendant, of arrears of alimbny. The plaintiff should be
left to enforce the payment of the alimony previously ordered, in the
usual way: Id.
Amount.-Where the defendant's property, over and above the debts
owing by him, amounted to but $12,550; Held, that alimony to the
amount of $600 annually was full as much as should have been allowed
to the plaintiff: Id.
INSURANCE.
Assignment of -Policy without Consent.-One of the conditions to a
policy of insurance was that it should not be assigned without the con-
sent of the company endorsed on it. In case of assignment without
such consent, whether of the whole policy or an interest in it, the lia-
bility of the company should thenceforth cease. The assured assigned
the policy as collateral security for a lien against the property insured
without obtaining the consent of the company; the property was
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burned; afterwards the assured paid the lien. Held, that he could not
recover for the loss, not having had the consent of the company to the
assignment: Ferree v. Oxford Ins. Co., 67 Penna.
Policy-Assignment-Chancer y.-Vhen the charter of an insurance
company provides that a sale of property insured shall render the policy
thereon void, but provides further that the grantee having the policy
assigned to him may have the same ratified and confirmed to him, &c.,
upon application to the directors and with their consent, within thirty
days next after such alienation, by giving security, &c., and this was
incorporated in the policy of insurance, which was to the assured, his
heirs and assigns, it was held that the sale did not render the policy
void, it having been assigned to the grantee at the time of the sale;
and the assignee having complied with the terms of the policy in mak-
ing the application to have the assignment ratified and no objection
existing to the person of the assignee, the company was bound to ratify
the assignment: Boynton v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 43 Vt.
Therefore where under these circumstances the premises were de-
stroyed by fire before the application for ratification of the assignment
reached the company, and on receiving it the directors refused to ratify
the assignment, it was held that the policy was still in force in favor of
the assignee and he was entitled to a decree in his favor against the
company for the same amount that his grantor would have recovered
b ad there been no sale and conveyance of the property: Id.
JUDOGIENT. See Attorney,.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Estate at Will-Tenancyl from Year to Year- Con vertibility-Notice
-Tespass.-An estate at will is converted into a tenancy from year to
year by the payment of rent; and the conversion is wrought, not by the
length of time that the tenant holds and pays rent, but by the fact that
the tenant enters and holds under a stipulation to pay annual rent, and
pays accordingly: Sils y v. Allen, 43 Vt.
When the estate becomes converted to a tenancy from year to year,
six months' notice of the termination of the tenancy, and looking to the
end of the year, is necessary: Id.
LIBEL.
Innuendo-Indictment.-It is sufficient in indictments that the charge
be stated with so much certainty, that the defendant may know what he
is called to answer and the court how to render proper judgment. In
criminal pleading, courts should look more to 'substantial justice than
artificial nicety: Commonwealth v. Keenan, 67 Penna.
Where no new fact is essential to the frame of an indictment for libel
or to be found by the grand jury as the ground of a colloquium which
cannot be dispensed with and the only object of an innuendo is to give
point to the meaning of the language, it is not proper to quash the
indictment on the ground that the innuendo may be supposed to carry
the meaning of the language beyond the customary meaning of the
word. It is for the jury to say whether the meaning averred in the
innuendo expresses the true meaning of the word: Id.
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A grand jury may ignore a count, but cannot find less than the
whole of any one count: Id.
A petit jury may find part of a count, if it be in itself a substantial
offence within the charge in the indictment: Id.
If some of the innuendoes in an indictment for libel extend the mean-
ing of parts too far, but there be others sufficient to give point to it, the
jury may convict under the latter alone: Id.
If all the innuendoes be defective, the prosecutor has a right to pro-
ceed, to subject the defendant to costs : Id.
A petit jury may impose costs on a defendant under a defective in-
dictment: Id.
Courts refuse to quash where the indictment is for a serious offence
unless on the clearese"and plainest ground, but will compel the party to
demur, to move in arrest of judgment or to a writ of error: ld."
Lis PENDENS. See Attachment.
MECHANICS' LIEN.
Consent of Landlord.-A landlord in writing extended the lease of
his tenants in consideration that they would make certain improvements
"at their own cost." The improvements were made. The material-man
entered a lien against the building under the Acts of May 1st 18"61 and
February 16th 1865, authorizing liens for alterations, with the proviso,
that there shall be no lien where the alteration has been made by the
lessee "without the written consent of the owner." Held, that the
premises were not liable to the lien: M Clintock v. Criswell, 67 Penna.
The consent to repair in the agreement was only upon the condition
of payment by the lessees and was not within the acts: Id.
The consent intended by the acts is an absolute consent, consistent
with the right to do the work on the credit of the building: Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Negligence-Injuy by Falling of a Pole in Street.-Where a street
in an incorporated town has been opened and graded by the town autho-
rities and under their jurisdiction, although a portion of it may have
been conceded as an easement to a railroad, the authorities are not
relieved from the obligation to remove dangerous nuisances: .Norristown
v. Moyer, 67 Penna.
The use by a citizen of public ways is that of transit only, with such
stoppages as business, necessity, accident, or the ordinary exigencies of
travel may require: Id.
Loungers who occupy the public highway are obstructions of the pub-
lic right of way and nuisances: Id.
A railroad by ordinance of the town council and Act of Assembly was
laid upon a street; the plaintiff loading a cart on the railroad track from
a car was in the street for a lawful purpose : Id.
The plaintiff whilst loading his cart was injured by the falling of a
pole in the street, erected by citizens years before, the pole having
become rotten. Held, that it was the duty of the town to have had the
pole removed and they were liable for the injury to the plaintiff, whether
the neglect was wilful or not: Id.
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It was not necessary that the town should have had notice of the con-
dition of the pole: nor it was material that the pole was in such part
of the road as not to obstruct the travel: Icd.
After the plaintiff was hurt money was raised by charitable subscrip-
tion and paid to him; this was not to be taken into consideration in
estimating damages: 1d.
NEGLIGENCE. See Highway, Municipal Corporation, Railroad.
PARTNERSHIP.
Special Partner -Executon.-V. & S. entered into articles of limited
partnership, V. as special partner to contribute -$3000 in cash; he con-
tributed in cash about $700, and the remainder in goods; no appraise-
ment of the goods was made and the sign was in the name of S. only,
&c. Held, that under the Act of March 30th 1865, V. was to be
treated as a general partner: Tandike v. Rosskam et al., 67 Penna.
The goods contributed by V. were subject to all the incidents of pro-
perty of a general partnership, and were not the sole property of V. : Id.
On an execution against one partner the sheriff can levy only on the
interest of the partuer in the firm and cannot seize the goods of the
firm : Id.
Firm goods were levied on as the property of S., one of the partners:
in an interpleader, the issue was to try whether the goods were V.'s, the
other partner. The court in answer to a point charged that the sheriff
could levy only S.'s interest in the firm, but added he might seize the
corpus. Held, that the point was irrelevant, and the qualification did
V. no harm: Id.
If the issue had been whether the goods were the firm's, the qualifi-
cation would have been error: ld.
RAILROAD. See Municipal Corporation.
-Negligence.-In an action for death by negligence from cars striking
a cart on scales near to a railroad track, evidence was proper that after
the accident the track was removed to a greater distance : West Chester
and Philadelphia Railroad Co. v. AcElwee, 67 Penna.
If the track was too near the scales, a higher degree of care was
necessary to avoid the accident: Id.
What is negligence is always a question for the jury, when the
measure of duty is ordinary and reasonable care: Id.
When the standard of the degree of care shifts with circumstances, it
is always for the jury: Id.
When the standard is fixed; when the measure of duty is defined by
law and is the same under all circumstances, its omission is negligence
and may be so declared by the court: Id.
When there is such an obvious disregard of duty and safety as
amounts to misconduct, the court may declare it to be negligence: Id.
VENDOR AND VENDEE. See Contract.
